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Corporate Governance and Firm Risk 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose: This study explores the relationship between the board governance structure and 
firm risk. Specifically, we develop a ‘Governance index’ based on four different aspects of 
the board: 1. Board composition, 2. Board leadership structure, 3. Board member 
characteristics and 4. Board processes, and examine how the overall index relates to firm risk. 
Design: The study is conducted using a sample of 268 UK firms from the FTSE 350 index, 
over the period 2005 to 2010. An index is constructed to capture the overall governance 
structure of the firm. Regressions of the index on three risk measures are examined. 
Findings: We find that the governance index that aggregates the four sets of board attributes 
is significantly negatively related to firm risk.  Robustness tests confirm this result. 
Research Implications: A large number of studies have explored the relationship between 
the attributes of corporate boards and firm performance, with mixed results. A much smaller 
number of studies have looked at board attributes and firm risk, but these have either focused 
on financial sector firms alone, or have included only a single or a limited number of 
attributes. This study, utilizing a broad agency framework, seeks to extend the work on firm 
risk and board attributes, by both expanding industry sectors examined and employing a 
comprehensive set of board attributes. 
Originality: The findings have policy and practical implications for investors, regulators, and 
chairmen of boards of governors to the extent that they inform these constituencies about the 
set of board attributes that are associated with firm risk. This study is the first to utilize a 
comprehensive measure of governance and relate it to firm risk. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to utilise a comprehensive set of corporate governance attributes 
focusing on the board of directors to determine an overall ‘Governance Index’ representing 
governance effectiveness; and investigate how this relates to firm risk.  The role of 
corporate governance and risk management has been highlighted following recent 
regulatory reforms. For example, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK, 
published  Boards  and  Risk  (FRC,  2011)  outlining the responsibilities of boards of 
directors for  ‘risk decision-making’, determining ‘the company’s approach to risk, setting 
its culture, risk identification, oversight of risk management, and crisis management’. In the 
US, corporate governance reforms which form part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) provide 
specific guidance on internal control mechanisms and board attributes to improve corporate 
accountability and reduce the risk of firm insolvency.  
Prior research on governance indices typically measure areas such as shareholder rights 
(Gompers et al., 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Bebchuk et al., 2009), ownership and 
leadership structures (Anlin et al., 2007), or the severity of agency conflicts (Renders and 
Gaeremynck, 2012). Following Zahra and Pearce (1989), we focus on the internal structure 
of governance and group board attributes into four factors: 1. Board composition, 2. Board 
leadership structure, 3. Board member characteristics and 4. Board processes. We construct 
a Governance Index based on the above attributes and examine its relationship with 
different measures of firm risk. The governance index can potentially indicate to investors the 
boards that are more risk-seeking or risk-averse based on their composition, leadership 
structure, characteristics and the processes they follow. This index differs from those in prior 
studies given that the former tend to focus on external and stakeholder factors and not so 
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much on internal board attributes. Furthermore, no prior studies have examined an overall 
index based on the board attributes of governance in relation to firm risk.  
Prior empirical literature on the composition of boards and the attributes of board members 
has tended to focus on the relationship between these factors and firm performance (Dalton et 
al., 1998; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Van der Walt et al., 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; 
Brown and Caylor, 2009; Adams et al., 2010; Bozec et al., 2010; Mangena et al., 2012; 
Bhagat and Bolton, 2013; Upadhyay et al., 2014) or other dimensions such as firm innovation 
(Zona et al., 2013); or they focus on the factors that make boards effective (Minichilli et al., 
2009; Ben-Amar et al., 2013). However, limited prior research shows that certain 
attributes of corporate governance are linked to the variability in performance, or 
firm risk. These studies are typically based on US samples in the financial sector 
(Pathan, 2009; Llewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 2012) and/or involve only a limited set of board 
attributes such as board size, independence, CEO power and board equity ownership (Brick 
and Chidambaran, 2008; Cheng, 2008; Delgado-García et al., 2010; Geppert et al., 2013) 
rather than an overall governance index.  
Using a sample of 267 non-financial firms, drawn from the FTSE 350 index over the years 
2005 to 2010, we find that the Governance index is significantly associated with measures 
of firm risk. Specifically, we find that a larger value of the Governance Index is associated 
with lower firm risk. The Governance index is composed of four attributes: 1. Board 
Composition, which consists of variables relating to board size, the proportion of non-
executive directors and gender diversity, 2. Board Leadership Structure which indicates the 
power of the chief executive officer (hereafter, CEO) and executives’ equity ownership, 3. 
Board Characteristics which includes the average age and tenure of board members, and 4. 
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Board Process which includes variables related to percentage of board attendance and 
frequency of audit meetings. 
We contribute to the corporate governance literature in two ways. First, we examine how a 
comprehensive set of board attributes are associated with firm risk; the lack of studies in the 
literature that examine this relationship is significant because firms’ long-term shareholders 
are not only concerned with the size and growth in their investment, but also the volatility 
in the returns, which is a measure of firm risk (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009). Second, we 
measure an overall board index or Governance Index, which represents the internal 
structure and process of the board of directors, rather than external factors related to 
governance or how the board interacts with stakeholders. This index can be used by 
shareholders and other stakeholders to gauge the level of risk-taking in firms based on the 
governance structure. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the 
theoretical context for our study and reviews the empirical literature on board attributes and 
governance indices from which we develop the hypothesis to be tested.  In section three, we 
outline the methodology employed and present the development of the Governance index, 
along with the sample selection. In section four, we present and discuss the empirical 
findings and robustness tests, followed by concluding remarks in the final section. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Board attributes and risk 
Prior empirical studies that have examined the relationship between board 
attributes and firm risk typically examine only a limited number of board attributes. 
For example, Pathan (2009) finds, in a sample of 212 US banks over 1997-2004 that firm risk 
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is negatively associated with board size, the number of independent directors and CEO power 
but is positively associated with CEO equity ownership.  Cheng (2008) also finds, in a US 
sample over the period 1996-2004, that board size is negatively associated with variability 
of firm performance, or firm risk. Platt and Platt (2012) examine several board attributes 
in relation to insolvency and find that bankrupt firms have less independent directors, 
smaller board sizes, higher equity ownership by directors, and smaller audit, 
compensation and nomination committees. This implies that these factors are related to 
firm risk. Mathew et al. (2015) find a significant relationship between firm risk and board 
size, as well as executive and institutional ownership using a UK-based sample.   
Other studies that study board attributes in relation to firm risk include those that examine 
board independence which find this to be negatively related to firm risk (Brick and 
Chidambaran, 2008; Djerbi and Anis, 2015) and CEO power which is positively related to 
firm risk (Adams et al., 2005; Llewellyn and Muller-Kahle,  2012; Djerbi and Anis, 2015). 
Furthermore board ownership is found to be related to firm risk (Saunders et al., 1990); 
specifically, family ownership vs. diversified ownership leads to different risk profiles and 
managerial risk-taking in the context of international acquisitions (Geppert et al., 2013). 
Harjoto et al. (2014) also find that boards with diversity in terms of gender, race, age, 
experience, tenure and expertise are more risk averse. Callen and Fang (2013) find that 
transient institutional investor ownership increases firm risk. Gender diversity in top 
management levels is also associated with lower firm risk (Perryman et al., 2016). Sun and 
Liu (2014) ascertain that banks with long board tenure audit committees have lower total and 
idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, Bennett (2013) confirm that increased monitoring, through 
increased board attendance as well as other factors, is associated with less risk-taking. 
Therefore, empirical evidence shows that specific board attributes are associated with firm 
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risk. However, governance attributes do not exist in isolation and the combination of these 
attributes can lead to different risk-taking behaviour. The following section discusses prior 
empirical research that has developed indices to capture overall governance structures.  
2.2 Governance indices 
Prior research that has examined a combination of board attributes typically forms an index 
that represents board effectiveness.  Some well-known indices such as the Governance Risk 
indicator (GRId) formulated by Institutional Shareholders Services Inc. combine variables 
representing board composition and independence, compensation, ownership, audit process 
and shareholder rights/takeover defences (ISS, 2012). However, many of the indices used in 
prior research measure only external factors such as shareholder rights. For example, 
Gompers et al. (2003) use the incidence of twenty four governance rules to construct a 
governance index to proxy for the level of shareholder rights. They find that firms with 
stronger shareholder rights have higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower 
capital expenditures, and make fewer corporate acquisitions. Bebchuk et al. (2009) provide an 
entrenchment index based on six shareholder rights provisions and find that this index is 
associated with firm value.   
Other research measuring an overall governance index include Brown and Caylor (2006), 
who examine a set of 51 firm-specific provisions representing both internal and external 
governance and test how these relate to firm valuation. They include shareholder rights factors 
(e.g. whether the board is staggered and if there are poison pill agreements) as well as some 
internal factors (e.g. independence of board members and attendance at board meetings). 
Anlin et al. (2007) provide an index representing ownership and leadership structures and 
examine how this relates to share price in Taiwanese firms. The index includes factors related 
to: CEO duality, size of the board of directors, management’s holdings and block 
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shareholders’ holdings. They find that the index can proxy for effective governance and is 
associated with firm value. Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) construct a measure of the 
severity of the principal-principal conflict which includes variables that increase majority 
shareholders’ ability to extract private benefits. They use the index to measure governance 
effectiveness and relate to firm value. Therefore, prior studies presenting governance 
indices tend to focus on external and stakeholder factors and focus on how the index 
relates to firm value and performance.  
2.3 Hypothesis development 
In terms of overall governance factors that relate to firm risk, it is likely that internal factors 
related to the board will be more relevant. According to agency theory, the separation of 
ownership and control has the potential to create agency problems, which can result in agents 
employing strategies to promote their self-interest to the detriment of principals (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Therefore, boards of directors are needed to 
monitor the firm’s activities in the interest of stakeholders including shareholders, creditors, 
employees and society (Mallin, 2013).  Utilising an agency perspective, Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) propose four attributes of the board, namely composition, structure, characteristics 
and process that influence how boards carry out their roles as seen in Figure 1. These 
attributes represent a mix of attributes specific to board members as well as the overall 
functioning of the board. Board composition refers to the size of the board and the mix of 
board members e.g. in terms of independence. Board structure refers to board organization 
and division of labor among committees. Board characteristics refer to directors’ experience 
and factors that influence the performance of their tasks. Finally, board process refers to the 
decision-making related activities (Zahra and Pearce, 1989, p. 292).  The mix of attributes 
therefore determines how the board carries out the roles of control, service and strategy 
which influence strategic outcomes and hence firm performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  It 
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is expected that the board attributes will be related to firm risk through their impact on the 
strategic direction of management and control function. 
(Figure 1) 
Based on the categories of board attributes discussed in Zahra and Pearce (1989), namely 
board composition, leadership structure, board characteristics and board processes, it is 
expected that a single Governance Index that forms a measure of the overall governance 
environment and monitoring effectiveness based on these attributes will be related to firm 
risk. Therefore, our hypothesis is as follows: 
Ha:  A governance index which consists of board composition, leadership structure, 
board characteristics and board process is related to firm risk. 
3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
The sample in this study is comprised of firms in the UK-based FTSE 350 index over the 
period 2005-2010. The time period is selected to follow the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005. We exclude utility and financial firms due to 
their different regulatory environment and include all firms that were on the index for at least 
two consecutive years to reduce survivorship bias. This results in an unbalanced sample of 
267 firms over the period or 1,410 observations. Financial data was collected from the 
Bloomberg database and data on the board members was hand collected from the 
Morningstar database. Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample by industry and year. As 
can be seen from the table, the sample ranges from 228 to 242 firm-observations per year. 
The majority of the observations are from the industrials and consumer service industries 
(N=420+413=833). The next largest industry in terms of sample observations is consumer 
goods (N=190) followed by basic materials (N=106) and oil and gas (104). The industrial 
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distribution across years is consistent. 
(Table 1) 
 
To analyse the relationship between board attributes and firm risk, we use the following 
linear regression model based on Adams et al.  (2005), Cheng (2008) and Pathan (2009): 
Ln(Riskit) = α0 + α1 Governance Indexit + α2 Leverageit + α3 Firm Sizeit + α4 Growthit +  α4 
Performanceit-1 + ∑j=1-8 αj (Industry Dummiesit) + ∑t=1-6 αt  (Year Dummiesit) + εit (1) 
Where 
Risk i t Firm risk for firm i in year t measured as either Total Risk, Asset Return Risk  
or Idiosyncratic Risk, as described in the next section; 
Governance 
Indexit 
the Governance Index for firm i in year t, as described in the next section; 
Leverageit Average total assets of firm i in year t over average total common equity; 
Firm Sizeit Market capitalization of firm i in year t measured as total value of issued 
shares;  
Growthit Capital expenditures of firm i in year t over sales; 
Performanceit-1 Return on assets for firm i in year t-1 measured as net income over total 
assets; 
εit The residual. 
 
We use Generalised Least Squares random effects method to estimate the model since board 
attributes which are time invariant cannot be estimated with fixed effect regressions.  We 
include several control variables that may impact the level of firm risk in the above regression. 
Firstly, we include Leverage since high financial leverage is associated with less firm risk due 
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to the burden of repayment (Cheng, 2008). We also include Firm Size as large firms 
may have more natural hedges against economic fluctuations, better access to capital 
markets and can borrow on better terms (Ferri and Jones, 1979). We also include Growth 
as firms that have more growth opportunities will take this opportunity to expand and take on 
new projects which might impact firm risk.  Lagged Performance  is included since firms 
can change risk taken in a particular year through investment choices depending on the 
previous performance of the firm (Cheng, 2008). Finally, we include industry and year 
dummies as control variables.  
 
3.1 Measures of risk  
Three alternative measures of firm risk are employed based on Laeven and Levine (2009) 
and Pathan (2009). Specifically, we use Total Risk, Asset Return Risk and Idiosyncratic 
Risk as defined below (firm and year subscripts have been excluded for simplicity): 
Total Risk  Standard deviation of annualised daily stock returns measured as the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of equity return series; 
Asset Return Risk  Ratio of market value of equity to market value of total assets times the 
standard deviation of annualised daily stock returns for a firm*√250; 
Idiosyncratic Risk Risk specific to the firm downloaded from Bloomberg database. 
 
The first measure, Total Risk, uses market data and includes both the risk involved in the 
particular stock (idiosyncratic risk) and market risk (systematic risk). This reflects the 
market’s perception about the risks inherent in the firm’s assets and liabilities. Both 
regulators and firm executives frequently monitor this risk (Pathan, 2009). 
Asset Return Risk is used as an alternative risk measure which represents the variance of 
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asset returns.  Following  Flannery  and Rangan (2008)  and  Pathan  (2009),  volatility  of  
asset returns is computed as the ratio of market value of equity to market value of total  
assets multiplied by the  standard  deviation  of  the  daily  stock  returns and annualised by 
multiplying the resulting value by the square root of the approximate number of trading 
days in the year which is 250. 
Idiosyncratic Risk represents risk specific to the firm which is unrelated to the market and 
cannot be diversified away. This data was obtained from the Bloomberg database. 
 
3.2 Construction of Governance Index 
The Governance Index is a proxy for governance effectiveness and focuses on the internal 
mechanism and attributes of the board of directors. It is composed of factors related to: 1. 
Board composition, 2. Board leadership structure, 3. Board characteristics and 4. Board 
processes. The specific variables included f r each board attribute is guided by prior 
empirical research as included in the literature review. All variables included in the index 
are constructed by using indicator variables taking the value of 1 when the value of the 
variable is either above or below the median. In our choice of the direction of the indicator 
variables, we rely on prior research in determining whether the variable is expected to be 
positively or negatively related to firm risk.
1
 We therefore propose a proxy which we expect 
to measure board effectiveness in terms of risk behavior; specifically, we expect this proxy 
to be negatively related to firm risk.  
Our first attribute, Board Composition is composed of board size, the proportion of non-
                                                            
1
 In untabulated results, we also regress firm risk on each board attribute separately to confirm the direction of 
the association. 
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executive directors (NEDs) and the percentage of women on the board. As shown in the 
literature a large board size, a higher percentage of NEDs and higher percentage of women on 
the board is related to low firm risk (e.g. Pathan, 2009; Harjoto et al., 2014) and better 
monitoring (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Therefore board size that is equal and larger than the 
median value in the sample is assigned the value 1, otherwise it takes the value 0 (I-Board 
Size). Similarly, the percentage of NEDs and percentage of women on the board that have a 
value equal to or greater than the median take the value of 1 (indicative of low risk), 
otherwise they take the value 0 (I-Percentage of NEDs and I-Percentage of Women).  
The second factor, Board Leadership Structure, consists of three variables – Powerful CEO, 
Board executive ownership and Block ownership. The first variable, I-Powerful CEO takes the 
value 0 if the CEO is also the chairperson, the chairperson is an executive, or the CEO is a 
founder of the firm, and 1 otherwise; given that powerful CEOs are positively related to risk 
(e.g. Adams et al., 2005). The second variable I-Board Executive Ownership takes the value 0 
when board ownership is greater than the median value and 1 otherwise. This is in line with 
prior research that finds that board ownership is positively related to firm risk (Pathan, 
2009) and negatively related to earnings quality in line with the management entrenchment 
theory (Pergola and Joseph, 2011). Lastly, I-Block Ownership takes the value 0 when 
percentage of equity owned by institutional investors is greater than the median value and 1 
otherwise, given that there is a positive relationship between institutional investor 
ownership and firm risk (Callen and Fang, 2013).  
The third attribute, Board Characteristics, consists of variables related to board member  
age and tenure. The first variable, I-Board Age is created which takes the value 1 when 
board age is greater than the median, 0 otherwise. Also I-Board Tenure takes the value 1 
when board tenure is greater than the median and 0 otherwise given that higher age and 
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tenure are linked with lower firm risk (Harjoto et al., 2014, Sun and Liu, 2014).  
The final attribute, Board Process, consists of the variables related to board meetings 
attendance and frequency of audit committee meetings. I-Board Attendance takes the value 1 
when board attendance of the board members is greater than the median, 0 otherwise. Also 
I-Frequency of Audit Meetings takes the value 1 when total number of audit committee 
meetings is greater than the median, 0 otherwise. Since board meetings are found to be 
negatively related to firm risk (Bennett, 2013), these variables are constructed in this way.  
The overall measure of governance related to board attributes, the Governance I ndex, is 
constructed by combining all the variables described above in the four categories. The index 
can range from 0 to 10 given that it includes 10 indicator variables taking on the value 0 or 1. 
Governance  Index  =  I-Board Size + I-Proportion of NEDs + I-Percentage of Women + I-
Powerful CEO + I-Board E qu i t y  Ownership + I-Block Ownership +  I-Board Age + I-
Board Tenure + I-Board Attendance + I-Frequency of Audit Meetings 
4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
We begin by presenting descriptive statistics for all board variables as well as the index, 
dependent and control variables in Table 2. The results show that the mean board size of the 
sample is 8.95 ranging from a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 19; the mean percentage of 
NEDs is 62% and the percentage of women on boards is about 8%. Furthermore, the 
percentage of firms with a powerful CEO is 18% and the mean value of board ownership 
is 4%, ranging from 0% to 72%. The mean percentage of block ownership held by 
institutional investors is 34%, while the mean tenure of the board is about 5 years 
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and mean age of the board members is about 56 years. Average board attendance is 95% 
per year while the mean frequency of audit meetings is 4 times per year. 
(Table 2) 
In terms of the descriptive statistics of the board index, we find that the Governance index 
ranges from 0 to 9 with a mean of 4.34 and standard deviation of 1.75.  
In terms of the risk variables, the mean value for Total Risk is 0.4 with a standard deviation 
of 0.2. Asset return risk had a mean of 0.39 and standard deviation of 0.19 while 
Idiosyncratic Risk has a mean of -0.57 and standard deviation of 0.50. 
In terms of the control variables, Leverage has a mean of 5.01 with a standard deviation of 
39.69 which shows that the variation in leverage across the sample is high. The smallest Firm 
Size is £10 million and the largest of £138 billion while Growth has a minimum value of 0.02 
and a maximum of 1,555. Finally, Lagged Performance has a mean of 7.57 and ranges from -
175.74 to 175.92.  
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the board variables, with 
significant correlations (at the 10% level or less) shown in bold. The highest correlation is 
between Firm Size and Board Size which is 0.48; all other correlations are below this value. 
Therefore, multicollinearity between the independent variables is not of concern. The 
Percentage of NEDs is negatively correlated to the presence of a Powerful CEO, (β=-0.42, 
p<0.05) indicating that powerful CEOs may want less challenge by having more NEDs on 
board.  
(Table 3) 
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The Frequency of Audit Meetings and Firm size are positively correlated (β = 0.41, p <.05), 
showing that larger firms require more attention from the audit committee and for such firms 
the board size is also large. Powerful CEO is also positively and significantly correlated with 
Board Ownership with a value of 0.33.  
The correlation between the dependent variables and the explanatory variables are also 
presented and even though many coefficients are significant, no correlation coefficient 
exceeds the value of 0.2. 
4.2 Main Results 
Table 4 shows the results using the Governance index as the independent variable with all 
three risk measures. The results in the table show that the Governance index is 
significantly and negatively related to Total Risk (β = -0.020, p <.001), Asset Return Risk 
(β = -0.019, p<.001) and Idiosyncratic Risk (β = -0.037, p <.001).  
As discussed above, the Governance Index is a sum of indicator variables related to the 
aforementioned governance attributes and can vary from 0 to 9. The results show that an 
increase in the Governance Index by 1 unit reduces total firm risk by 2%, which is a decrease 
in its stock price volatility. To further investigate the impact of changes in the governance 
attributes on the Governance Index, we consider some firms where the index has 
increased/decreased by one unit. For example, BT Group PLC, in the telecommunications 
sector, had a Governance Index of 3 in year 2007 and 4 in 2008. Examination of the reasons 
behind this change shows that it was due to an increase in the percentage of NEDs on the 
board from 62% to 67%. Furthermore, the index increased from 4 to 5 between 2008 and 
2009. This was due to an increase in the audit committee meetings from 4 to 5 over that 
period. Another example is Electrocomponents PLC, from the technology sector. The 
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Governance Index for this firm decreased from 5 to 4 between 2008 and 2009. This was due 
to a decrease in the average age of the board of director members from 57 to 54 due to the 
retirement of a board member. Therefore, small changes by firms can result in a one-unit 
change in the index and therefore a significant reduction in firm risk. 
The findings above indicate that lower firm risk is associated with a higher value of the 
governance index which on average represents firms with large boards, more NEDs and 
more women on the board; firms that have a leadership structure that does not have a  
powerful CEO, the equity held by executive board members is not large and equity held 
by institutional investors is not large. Also, the boards with lower risk have  members  who  
are  older  and  have  longer  tenure  with  the  firm. Moreover, they have more audit 
committee meetings and better board meeting attendance. Specifically, a unit increase in 
Governance index is associated with a 2% lower Total Risk.  
The Governance index can be used by shareholders and regulators to identify firms that 
have boards with lower firm risk. We make no assumptions regarding the relationship 
between the level of risk and current or future performance. However, untabulated results 
show that there is a negative relationship between risk in the current year and future 
performance. 
(Table 4) 
In terms of the results for the control variables, we find that larger firms are associated 
significantly with less risk, particularly Total Risk. On the other hand, firms with higher 
growth opportunities are associated with greater firm risk across all risk measures. Firms 
with higher financial leverage also have lower risk. Finally,  the  previous  performance   of  
the  firm  is  found  to  be  inversely  related  to firm risk, implying that if the previous 
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performance of the firm is poor, managers take on more risk in the current period. 
4.3 Robustness Tests:  
In an empirical model, when the dependent variable predicts independent variables, then 
there is reverse causality. In the presence of reverse causality, estimations produce biased 
results. Therefore to check for the extent to which endogeneity (due to reverse causality) is a 
problem, the following test is conducted.   
To confirm that causation runs from board index to firm risk, the explanatory variables on the 
right hand side of empirical model are replaced by their lagged values. The equations are re-
estimated using generalised least squares with lagged explanatory variables and dependent 
variable of total firm risk. This test to check for reverse causality has been previously used by 
Pathan (2009) in his study of how board composition relates to bank risk. The argument for 
using lagged independent variables is that current values may be endogenous but it is unlikely 
that past values are subject to the same problem. The results for the Governance index with 
lagged explanatory variables are shown in Table 5. The results show that the estimations are 
similar to the estimation using contemporaneous independent variables. The significance of 
the relationship is similar to the estimates using current independent variables and the 
direction of the relationship is the same. This shows that endogeneity is not a cause for 
concern in the empirical model used in this study.  
(Table 5) 
Additional analysis using Instrumental variable estimation was conducted as a robustness test 
to address the endogeneity concern (using xtivreg in STATA). The instruments used were the 
board attributes that form the board governance index. The results (as shown in Table 6) are 
similar to the results using the random effects methodology. Specifically, the Governance 
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index coefficient is -0.020, -0.019 and -0.036 (all significant at the 1% level) using Total 
Risk, Asset Return Risk, and Idiosyncratic Risk as dependent variables. This indicates that 
endogeneity is not a cause for concern in the model used for the study. 
(Table 6) 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Using a sample of 267 FTSE 350 UK firms between the years 2005 to 2010, our results show 
that a Governance index constructed from the composition, leadership structure, 
members’ characteristics and board process is negatively related to firm risk.  This finding 
is important for shareholders, regulators, and academicians as it identifies the factors that 
are significantly related to firm risk. Specifically, boards that are associated with lower 
firm risk have larger values of the Governance index which on average indicates 
they are larger boards, have  more NEDs and more women on the board; these boards 
also have a leadership structure that does not have a powerful CEO and the equity held by 
executive board members as well as institutional investors is not large. Also, the board 
members are older and have longer tenures with the firm. Moreover, these boards have 
more audit committee meetings and better board meeting attendance.  
As a robustness check, we check for endogeneity of the independent variables by estimating 
lagged independent variables with firm risk and find that there is no concern regarding 
endogeneity issues. We also find the same results when using the instrumental variable 
method. 
The policy implications of the findings come from the identification of the board attributes 
that represent the effectiveness of the board which are associated with firm risk. The use of 
a Governance index can inform regulators of which firms have effective boards in relation to 
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firm risk. Furthermore, the current study is significant in that it examines firm risk and 
governance attributes in a longitudinal, cross-sectional study. Previous studies focus on the 
financial sector, especially following the financial crisis of 2007/8 (e.g. Pathan, 2009; 
Llewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 2012). Therefore, we document that findings in previous 
research in the financial sector apply to other sectors as well. 
As with all research, this study has limitations. One potential limitation is the 
generalizability of the results. Since this study covers only UK firms, it is possible that 
the findings would not hold in different regulatory markets. Furthermore, the sample of 
firms consists of large firms in the UK market and therefore the results may not hold for 
smaller firms. Finally, the Governance index, while it is comprehensive and includes several 
governance attributes, does exclude some attributes such as board member experience, 
qualifications, and expertise. Although these are captured in some of the attributes used such 
as age and tenure, it may be useful to include them in a governance measure.  
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Appendix - Definition and Measurement of variables 
Variables Measures 
Board size The number of directors on the firm’s board  
Non-executive directors The percentage of non-executive independent board directors 
Percentage of women Percentage of women on the board 
Powerful CEO 
Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if there duality of CEO-chairman 
position, CEO is founder or Chairman is an executive. 
Board executive ownership 
Equity ownership of all the executive board members as a percentage of the 
outstanding shares 
Block ownership 
Percentage of total of substantial institutional investors holding more than 3% 
of shares in the firm 
Board Age  Average age of the board members in the firm 
Board Tenure Average tenure of the board members in the firm in years 
Board meeting attendance Average board attendance of the board members 
Audit Committee meeting The total number of audit committee meeting during the year 
Index Variables  
Board Composition   
I-Board Size Indicator variable that takes the value 1 when board size is greater than the median 
value, 0 otherwise 
I-Percentage of NEDs Indicator variable that takes the value 1 when proportion of NEDs is greater than the 
median value, 0 otherwise 
I-Percentage of Women Indicator variable that takes the value 1 when percentage of women is greater than 
the median value, 0 otherwise 
Board Leadership Structure  
I-Powerful CEO Indicator variable that takes the value 0 if the CEO is also the chairperson, the 
chairperson is an executive, or the CEO is a founder of the firm, and 1 otherwise 
I-Board Executive Ownership Indicator variable that takes the value 0 when board ownership is greater than the 
median value, 1 otherwise 
I-Block Ownership Indicator variable that takes the value 0 when percentage of equity owned by 
institutional investors is greater than the median value, 1 otherwise  
Board Characteristics   
I-Board Age Indicator variable that takes the value 1 when board age is greater than the median 
value, 0 otherwise 
I-Board Tenure Indicator variable that takes the value 1 when board tenure is greater than the 
median value, 0 otherwise 
Board Process  
I-Board Attendance Indicator variable that takes the value 1 when average board attendance of the board 
members is greater than the median value, 0  
I-Frequency of Audit Meetings Indicator variable that takes the value 1 when total number of audit committee 
meeting is greater than the median value, 0 otherwise  
Governance index 
 
I-Board Size + I-Proportion of NEDs + I-Percentage of Women + I-Powerful CEO 
+ I-Board Executive Ownership + I-Block Ownership +  I-Board Age + I-Board 
Tenure + I-Board Attendance + I - Frequency of Audit Meetings 
Risk Measures  
Total risk Standard deviation of the daily stock returns (annualised) 
Asset Return risk                     
 Standard deviation of the daily stock returns times the ratio of the market value of 
 
equity to market value of total assets*√250 
Idiosyncratic risk Firm specific risk from Bloomberg database 
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Control Variables  
Leverage Average total assets over average total common equity  
Firm Size 
The market capitalisation of the firm in billions measured as the total value of 
issued shares 
Growth Capital expenditures over sales 
Lagged Performance The lagged return on assets for the firm measured in millions 
IND 
 
Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if observation belongs to a particular 
industry, 0 otherwise 
YEAR 
 
Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is in a particular year, 0 
otherwise.  
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Figure 1: An agency theory model that links board variables and company performance 
 
Source: Zahra and Pearce, 1989, p. 294 
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Table 1: Industry distribution of sample by year 
Industry sector  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Oil and Gas  17 18 16 19 18 16 104 
Basic materials  14 16 15 19 21 21 106 
Industrials  70 72 72 70 70 66 420 
Consumer goods  33 35 31 31 31 29 190 
Healthcare  9 8 8 8 8 8 49 
Consumer service  65 68 69 70 72 69 413 
Telecommunications  4 5 5 5 5 5 29 
Technology  16 16 17 17 17 16 99 
Number of 
Observations 
228 238 233 239 242 230 1,410 
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TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics 
N = 1,410 
 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Min Max SD 
Board Variables        
Board Size 8.95 7.00 9.00 10.00 5.00 19.00 2.35 
Percentage of NEDs 62.63 55.56 62.50 71.43 28.57 92.31 11.76 
Percentage of women 7.69 0.00 6.68 12.5 0.00 17.54 9.36 
Powerful CEO 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.39 
Board Executive Ownership 3.63 0.07 0.21 1.11 0.00 71.60 10.29 
Block Ownership 34.14 17.94 31.06 47.39 31.06 100 22.06 
Board Age 56 53.65 56.08 58.24 45.24 70.52 3.41 
Board Tenure 5.45 3.67 4.91 6.57 0.26 17.54 2.62 
Board Attendance  94.82 93.00 96.00 98.50 51.00 100.00 5.68 
Frequency of Audit Meetings 4.03 3.00 4.00 4.00 1.00 15.00 1.50 
Governance Index 4.34 3 4 6 0 9 1.75 
Risk Measures        
Total Risk 0.40 0.26 0.35 0.47 0.14 1.62 0.20 
Asset Return Risk 0.39 0.26 0.34 0.47 0.13 1.54 0.19 
Idiosyncratic Risk -0.57 -0.85 -0.55 -0.28 -2.88 4.97 0.50 
Control Variables        
Leverage 5.01 1.89 2.58 3.70 -217.86 1,010.33 39.69 
Firm Size 5.36 0.49 0.98 2.59 0.01 138.69 15.88 
Growth 11.40 1.82 3.45 7.29 0.02 1,555.21 58.55 
Lagged Performance  7.57 3.38 6.56 10.64 -175.74 175.92 12.26 
        
All variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 3: Correlation Coefficients 
 
No Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Board size 1             
2 Proportion of NEDs 0.12 1            
3 Presence of Women 0.14 0.15 1           
4 Powerful CEO 0.02 -0.42 -0.12 1          
5 Board Ownership -0.11 -0.24 -0.13 0.33 1         
6 Block ownership -0.13 -0.01 -0.09 0.07 0.02 1        
7 Board Age 0.19 0.29 -0.18 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 1       
8 Board tenure -0.01 -0.25 -0.09 0.19 0.01 -0.02 0.20 1      
9 Board Attendance  -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.07 1     
10 Frequency of Audit Meetings 0.36 0.28 0.04 -0.09 -0.12 -0.14 0.24 -0.17 -0.05 1    
11 Leverage -0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01 1   
12 Firm Size 0.48 0.26 0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.19 0.25 -0.08 -0.01 0.41 -0.01 1  
13 Growth  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.13 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 1 
14 Lagged Performance 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.07 0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.05 
All correlation coefficients in bold are significant at the 10% level or below. 
All variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 4: Results from the regressions of Governance index with firm risk  
The table presents coefficients (t-statistics) from model of the form: 
Ln(Riskit) = α0 + α1 Governance Indexit + α2 Leverageit + α3 Firm Sizeit + α4 Growthit +  α4 
Performanceit-1 + ∑j=1-8 αj (Industry Dummiesit) + ∑t=1-6 αt  (Year Dummiesit) + εit   
The regression is estimated using Generalized Least Square – Random effects methodology. 
 
Independent Variables 
Predicted  Total 
Risk 
Asset 
Return 
Risk 
Idiosyncratic  
Risk sign 
Governance Index - 
-0.020 -0.019 -0.037 
(-3.79)*** (-3.72)*** (-4.30)*** 
Leverage - 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-1.38) (-1.44) (-0.26) 
Firm Size - 
0.000 0.000 0.56 
(-5.21)*** (-5.35)*** (-0.31) 
Growth + 
0.000 0.001 0.000 
(0.62) (0.71) (1.11) 
Lagged Performance - 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(-1.99)* (-1.73)† (-0.21) 
Industry Dummies 
 yes yes yes 
Year Dummies 
 yes yes yes 
Constant 
 
-0.875 -0.885 2.066 
(-16.63)*** (-7.62)*** (-0.54)*** 
No of observations 
 
1,410 1,410 1,410 
Model fit: 
 Within R
2
 0.683 0.680 0.1062 
Between R
2
 
 0.485 0.504 0.3311 
Overall R
2
 
 0.584 0.588 0.1857 
Wald Chi
2
(17) 
 2,664.73 2,649.12 256.23 
          
†p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001.  
All variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 5: Results from the regressions of Governance index using lagged independent 
variables with firm risk 
The table presents coefficients (t-statistics) from model of the form: 
Ln(Riskit) = α0 + α1 Governance Indexit + α2 Leverageit + α3 Firm Sizeit + α4 Growthit +  α4 Performanceit-1 + 
∑j=1-8 αj (Industry Dummiesit) + ∑t=1-6 αt  (Year Dummiesit) + εit   
The regression is estimated using Generalized Least Square – Random effects methodology. 
The empirical model is estimated using lagged explanatory variables to correct for endogeneity. 
 
Independent Variables 
Predicted   Total  
Risk 
Asset Return 
Risk 
Idiosyncratic  
Risk sign 
Governance Index - 
-0.017 -0.019 -0.029 
(-2.85)** (-3.24)*** (-3.34)*** 
Leverage - 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.13) (-0.19) (0.72) 
Firm Size - 
0.000 0.000 0.56 
(-4.12)*** (-4.19)*** (-0.71) 
Growth + 
0.000 0.001 -0.000 
(0.19) (0.19) (-0.47) 
Lagged Performance - 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(-1.42)* (-1.23)† (-0.20) 
Industry Dummies 
 yes yes yes 
Year Dummies 
 yes yes yes 
Constant 
 
-0.922 -0.920 0.522 
(-16.13)*** (-16.85)*** (-6.81)*** 
No of observations 
 
1,143 1,143 1,143 
Model fit: 
 Within R
2
 0.657 0.651 0.146 
Between R
2
 
 0.344 0.368 0.317 
Overall R
2
 
 0.517 0.522 0.208 
Wald Chi
2
(17) 
 1,774.46 1,744.32 257.06 
          
†p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001.  
All variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 6: Results from the regressions of Governance index with firm risk – 
Instrumental variables 
The table presents coefficients (t-statistics) from model of the form: 
Ln(Riskit) = α0 + α1 Governance Indexit + α2 Leverageit + α3 Firm Sizeit + α4 Growthit +  α4 Performanceit-1 + 
∑j=1-8 αj (Industry Dummiesit) + ∑t=1-6 αt  (Year Dummiesit) + εit   
The regression is estimated using Generalized Least Square – Random effects methodology. 
Instrumental variables using xtivreg in STATA was used to estimate the model above using the board 
attributes as the instruments.  
 
Independent Variables 
Predicted  Total  
Risk 
Asset 
Return 
Risk 
Idiosyncratic  
Risk sign 
Governance Index - 
-0.020 -0.019 -0.036 
(-3.67)*** (-3.59)*** (-4.08)*** 
Leverage - 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-1.44) (-1.50) (-0.33) 
Firm Size - 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-4.96)*** (-5.11)*** (-0.44) 
Growth + 
0.000 0.001 0.000 
(0.49) (0.61) (0.07) 
Lagged Performance - 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(-1.96)* (-1.72)† (-0.09) 
Industry Dummies 
 yes yes yes 
Year Dummies 
 yes yes yes 
Constant 
 
-0.876 -0.887 2.066 
(-16.02)*** 
(-
16.80)*** (-0.53)*** 
No of observations 
 
1,358 1,358 1,358 
Model fit: 
 Within R
2
 0.677 0.674 0.105 
Between R
2
 
 0.488 0.496 0.298 
Overall R
2
 
 0.579 0.582 0.184 
Wald Chi
2
(17) 
 2,505.18 2,485.93 237.95 
          
†p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001.  
All variables are defined in the appendix. 
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